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The importance of international learning
J E F F R E Y  W. K N O P F *
Abstract. A programme of research on learning in international relations began developing
in the 1980s. However, learning research has not realised its potential. This article seeks to
stimulate new work on learning by analysing why learning is important in international
relations and outlining a research focus that reflects this assessment of learning’s significance.
The research so far has mostly treated learning as a foreign policy phenomenon, but this fails
to capture one of the major reasons for interest in learning. Learning matters in part because
of long-standing debates about whether it is possible to make progress in reducing the
amount of armed conflict in world politics. For such progress to occur, it is likely that some
form of learning would have to take place. However, learning by just a single state will often
not be sufficient to change the quality of international outcomes. There thus needs to be
research specifically on the possibility of shared learning by two or more states, a research
focus this article will label ‘international learning’. A few illustrative examples will
demonstrate the feasibility of doing research on shared, cross-national learning.
Given the problems that recur in world politics, writing on international affairs has
often pointed to a need for learning or, more rarely, noted with satisfaction those
cases that appear to indicate the achievement of learning. Although casual interest
in learning has thus long existed, a scholarly research programme devoted to the
study of learning in international politics only emerged in the 1980s. After critics
pointed out conceptual problems in the initial studies, more recent examinations of
learning have narrowed their focus to how policymakers draw lessons from past
experience. At the same time, learning has become an important component of some
broader ideational theories, especially social constructivism, but this literature often
assumes that learning occurs rather than making it an object of research. This
article argues that empirical research specifically on learning is still needed, but
involving a different approach than is currently emphasised.
Research on learning has focused mainly on whether states or international
organisations (IOs) show learning in their own, individual policies. However, this
focus on what I will call ‘foreign policy learning’ is too narrow to address a major
reason why learning matters. In international relations, learning is relevant to
debates about whether it is possible to make progress in world politics, especially in
reducing the amount of conflict. For such progress to occur, it will at minimum be
helpful and may even be necessary for some form of learning to take place. However,
learning by just a single state will often not be sufficient to improve international
outcomes; more than one state may have to agree about how to change things for
change to occur. Thus, in addition to work on foreign policy learning, there also
needs to be research on the possibility of learning in common by two or more states,
a focus I will label ‘international learning.’
This article begins by showing that many studies that examine foreign policy
learning are really most interested in whether learning increases the chances for
cooperation or peace, but despite this they do not emphasise determining whether
relevant learning has spread in such a way as to make these outcomes possible. The
article suggests that this disconnect occurs because of steps taken to avoid anticip-
ated realist and positivist criticisms. Next, the article makes a case for research on
internationally shared learning by showing its significance for literatures ranging
from classical idealism to more recent work on constructivism and critical theory.
Final sections of the article describe two possible ways to conduct empirical research
on international learning. First, the article illustrates the possibility of agreement
across states on relevant lessons of history with examples from the 1991 Persian
Gulf War and nuclear arms control. Second, the article examines a clear case of
progress – the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil – in order to show it is
possible to identify learning that occurs along the road to conflict resolution.
Overall, this article seeks to show both why it is important for IR specialists to study
learning and that it is feasible to do so in a manner consistent with the reasons for
learning’s importance.
The emergence of the learning research programme
Although scholars of international politics have long made casual references to
learning, learning in international relations only became a significant research focus
in its own right in the 1980s. The research drew on notions of learning developed in
psychology, in comparative politics research on the diffusion of ideas, and in work
on organisational learning.1 In an early study, Etheredge investigated whether there
had been learning in US foreign policy towards Central America and the Caribbean
(he concluded there had not).2 Etheredge’s interest was thus foreign policy learning
by a single country.
Ernst Haas’s studies of international regimes,3 which argued that ‘cognitive evolu-
tion’ explains some regimes, developed into another line of research on learning.
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1 Given the length of this article and the fact I argue for a different approach to studying learning in
international relations, I will not review the learning research in other fields here. I refer interested
readers to excellent literature reviews in Philip E. Tetlock, ‘Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy:
In Search of an Elusive Concept’, in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds.), Learning in US
and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) and Jack S. Levy, ‘Learning and
Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield’, International Organization, 48 (1994), pp. 279–312.
2 Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? American Foreign Policy and Central American
Revolutions (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985).
3 Ernst B. Haas,‘Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes’, World Politics, 32 (1980),
pp. 357–405; Haas, ‘Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes’,
International Organization, 36 (1982), pp. 207–43.
Haas and some of his followers have shown the most interest in whether there is
shared learning. In addition, a volume edited by Adler and Crawford and a 1997
book by Haas also explicitly address the question of progress, including the issue of
whether cognitive evolution is a route to progress.4
The Haas school does not always distinguish cross-national learning, however,
from learning by individual states or organisations. Haas’s most detailed study of
learning, When Knowledge is Power,5 focuses on international organisations (IOs),
which naturally blurs the distinction between learning by a single entity and learning
by a collection of actors. At times, Haas discusses IOs as collections of states, in
which case any learning is implicitly shared across states. Much of the time, though,
Haas treats IOs as actors in their own right, which means the focus is on learning by
an individual organisation, without concern for whether its lessons are shared by
other international actors. His subsequent works also do not clearly distinguish
learning across countries from learning within countries.6
Interest in learning increased in the late 1980s in response to the Soviet ‘new
thinking’ and decline of the Cold War. Nye examined US and Soviet learning about
nuclear weapons.7 Nye’s article was largely speculative and did not attempt to
document the learning process, but it did represent a move toward asking whether
two states had learned in common.
More detailed empirical research on US and Soviet learning followed in a volume
of essays edited by Breslauer and Tetlock.8 The empirical research was divided into
chapters that generally dealt only with either the United States or the Soviet Union,
across a set of parallel issues. Only two chapters (by Lavoy and Weber) explicitly
compared US and Soviet policies, in the areas of non-proliferation and arms
control, respectively. The volume thus moved away from the question of common
learning to focus again on learning in individual states.
Thereafter, Janice Gross Stein applied learning concepts to studies of the US-
Soviet and Egyptian-Israeli accommodation processes.9 Stein pointed out that there
must be learning by both parties in an adversarial relationship if their conflict is to
be resolved. She describes a two-step process, however, in which the two sides do not
actually share the same learning. Rather, one side must learn that it can no longer
advance its values through conflict. It then has to help the second side learn that it
has actually changed its intentions.10 Such complementary learning is one possible
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4 Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1991); Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: The Rise and
Decline of Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
5 Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).
6 See Ernst B. Haas, ‘Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations’, in George W. Breslauer and
Philip E. Tetlock (eds.), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1991), p. 91; Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, p. 4.
7 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization,
41 (1987), pp. 371–402.
8 Breslauer and Tetlock (eds.), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy.
9 Janice Gross Stein, ‘Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as an Uncommitted Thinker and
Motivated Learner’, International Organization, 48 (1994), pp. 155–83; Stein, ‘Deterrence and
Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948–73’, Security Studies, 6 (1996), pp. 104–52.
10 Janice Gross Stein, ‘Image, Identity, and Conflict Resolution’, in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler
Hampson (eds.), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 93–111.
route to progress in reducing conflict, but it is also important to explore whether
states can learn things in common that help them achieve better outcomes.
In a 1994 review, Levy identified problems in the definition, measurement, and
causal model of learning employed in the initial wave of learning research.11 Levy
recommended scaling back to a narrower, less problematic research programme.
Specifically, Levy argued for focusing only on how individuals draw lessons from
previous experience, especially past foreign policies, in order to determine how these
affect subsequent foreign policy views.12 As I will show below, the most recent
research on learning has generally accepted this recommendation. However, this
narrower focus is not adequate to address all the issues that initially led IR scholars
to raise the question of learning.
Underlying motivations not always reflected in the research 
Few of the initial studies state at the outset why learning or its absence matter. Yet
the studies do not express equal interest in all possible lessons that states might
learn. Instead, most focus on issues related to peace or cooperation. In fact, Nye
considers learning only in relation to a possible outcome of cooperation, and Stein
only in relation to conflict reduction and resolution. Similarly, Haas sees learning as
a route to ‘managed interdependence.’13
However, not every lesson that leaders infer from past experience will be relevant
or conducive to such outcomes. Focusing empirically on what individual countries
learn from their earlier foreign policies may thus not be sufficient to address the
underlying motivation for studying learning. For example, Etheredge claims that
repeated US interventions in Central America reflect blocked learning: in particular,
an inability to recognise ‘the causes of international violence [and] the commonality
of humanity’.14 If reducing US military involvement in Central America is the goal
however, simply removing the blocks to learning from past foreign policy will not
necessarily help. This might only result in policymakers learning how to keep covert
interventions more covert or how to apply violence more effectively.
The gap between empirical focus and underlying motivations is greatest in the
Breslauer/Tetlock volume. Nowhere in the preface, introduction, or theoretical
overview chapter by Tetlock do the editors say why they wanted to study learning.
Only in the conclusion does Breslauer explain the motivation: ‘The normative
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11 Levy, ‘Learning and Foreign Policy’.
12 Shortly before Levy’s article appeared, Jarosz similarly depicted the process of drawing inferences
from history as the proper focus of learning research (William W. Jarosz with Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘The
Shadow of the Past: Learning from History in National Security Decision Making’, in Philip E.
Tetlock et al. (eds.), Behavior, Society, and International Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), pp. 126–89. Earlier, classic works on the role of historical analogies include Ernest R. May,
‘Lessons’ of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973); and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
13 Nye, ‘Nuclear Learning’, p. 372; Stein, ‘Image, Identity’, p. 101; Haas, When Knowledge is Power,
pp. 4, 128.
14 Etheredge, Can Governments Learn?, p. 162.
impulse for the project was to understand the conditions for ending the cold war and
reducing the incidence of large-scale international conflict’.15 Because this normative
concern was not stated up-front, it was not incorporated into the questions the
editors posed to the authors of the case studies. It is no surprise, therefore, that the
empirical chapters fail to address the question of whether the two sides had come to
share understandings that could reduce conflict.
In short, the first-wave scholars all investigated learning mainly in relation to
outcomes that advance liberal values. This suggests that the reason they wanted to
study learning is to explore the possibilities for conflict reduction and multilateral
cooperation, rather than to ascertain all the different lessons that state leaders
actually draw from past experience. If so, why wasn’t this made explicit? I believe the
reason lies in anticipated criticism from two strong traditions in IR research: realism
and positivism. Because of realist critiques of idealism, learning researchers were
reluctant to associate learning with only idealist outcomes. They thus hedged by
acknowledging that decision-makers could learn lessons that promote conflict as
well as reduce it, which leads toward a research agenda that considers all the lessons,
whether favourable to cooperation or not, that foreign policymakers might come to
believe. Awareness of positivist methodological standards created a similar concern:
not to let one’s personal values affect one’s scholarly judgments. Most studies thus
included an explicit statement that learning should not be defined so that it applies
only to policies of which one approves.16
This created an inherent tension in the first-generation studies. The desire not to
appear utopian or normatively biased encouraged taking a position that any new
belief a foreign policymaker might adopt could potentially be considered a form of
learning. At the same time, an interest in relating learning to prospects for peace or
cooperation required excluding some beliefs because they would not help advance
these goals. As a result, the scholars needed some way to differentiate learning that
might facilitate cooperation from forms of learning that hold little promise for
reducing conflict. Given their commitment to value neutrality, moreover, scholars
sought to define objective criteria that could make this distinction.
The first-wave studies sought to do this in two ways. First, they tried to judge
learning in terms of whether new beliefs reflect a more accurate picture of reality or
lead to more effective policies. Second, and more important, the studies generally
distinguished two kinds of learning. Nye uses the labels simple and complex, while
Haas differentiates between actual learning and mere adaptation. Simple learning
and adaptation involve changing only the means but not the goals of policy. Real or
complex learning, in contrast, involves the adoption of new causal beliefs that lead
actors to adjust their priorities or adopt a new solution. Not only did learning
researchers differentiate means-oriented from ends-oriented learning, they con-
tended that complex learning is the higher or more important type of learning.17
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15 George W. Breslauer, ‘What Have We Learned about Learning?’, in Breslauer and Tetlock, Learning
in US and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 825.
16 Tetlock, ‘Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy’, pp. 51–2; Nye, ‘Nuclear Learning’, p. 380; Haas,
When Knowledge is Power, p. 20; Jarosz, ‘The Shadow of the Past’, p. 132.
17 Nye, ‘Nuclear Learning’, p. 380; Haas, When Knowledge is Power, pp. 3, 23, 36, 175; Haas, ‘Collective
Learning’, pp. 72–3; Stein, ‘Deterrence and Learning’, p. 110.
The reason for attaching special importance to learning that involves the adoption
of new causal understandings or redefinition of goals is clearly an expectation that
this will generally lead actors to embrace policies that favour peace and cooperation.
In the end, therefore, as Levy points out, 18 scholars who attempted to find objec-
tive criteria for judging and categorising learning still tended to associate learning
with policies they favoured. Rather than label a policy change as learning because it
reflects one’s values, one associates learning with a description of reality or causal
understanding with which one agrees, which simply turns out to lead to the policy
one supports.
Two possible future directions
Given the various difficulties that arose in learning research, what can be done? One
possibility – which Levy espouses – is to avoid any possible normative bias. In order
to make the measurement of learning as objective as possible, Levy concludes that
learning should be defined as any change in an individual’s beliefs based on new
experiences, without any attempt by the observer to judge the accuracy or com-
plexity of those beliefs. In his research agenda, studies would focus solely on how
individuals draw inferences from history and experience. Levy describes the goal of
such research as being to explain foreign policy change;19 he does not relate learning
to questions regarding possible progress towards peace or cooperation.
Since Levy’s 1994 article, research on learning has generally followed his recom-
mendation. Books by Bennett, Farkas, and Leng all define learning as any change in
policymakers’ beliefs due to recent experiences or to lessons imparted by other
officials based on their experiences, regardless of the content of the new beliefs.20
These books also all treat learning as a potential explanation for foreign policy
change, thus retaining a focus on learning by individual countries.21 Only Leng, who
studies repeat crises between the same states, makes cross-national comparisons.
However, Leng finds that usually only hardline lessons were drawn in common,
leading to further conflict rather than conflict resolution. This is a useful reminder
that sharing lessons per se does not automatically encourage cooperation; it depends
on the ideas that are shared. But it also means that none of the recent studies
investigate whether shared learning occurs in ways that could facilitate improvement
in international outcomes.
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18 Levy, ‘Learning and Foreign Policy’, p. 292.
19 Ibid., p. 293, n. 54.
20 Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military
Interventionism, 1973–1996 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); Andrew Farkas, State Learning and
International Change (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Russell J. Leng,
Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-
Pakistani Rivalries (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
21 Bennett does include ‘international learning’, involving the transmission of ideas across international
borders, as a type of learning (Condemned to Repetition?, pp. 120, 369). But he treats it as a source of
beliefs that could explain individual foreign policy decisions, not a possible route to joint action or
policy convergence. Moreover, he concludes international learning played no role in his cases, so he
discusses it only quite briefly.
In short, Levy’s recommendations have channelled learning research into the
investigation of how leaders’ beliefs are shaped by experience. This is a valid area for
research, but to equate it with the study of learning is to conflate two distinct
research programmes. Individual belief systems and their impact on policy have long
been the province of a research programme already known by other labels, such as a
decision-making or cognitive approach. However, learning research has not had the
exact same concerns as decision-making research. The initial learning studies were
interested in learning primarily as a potential route to conflict resolution or inter-
national regime formation. But the suggestions made by Levy would require
jettisoning the normative concerns of this earlier research.
However, even from a positivist perspective, this is not necessary. The mainstream
understanding of the fact/value distinction that Levy and most learning researchers
embrace does not logically require banishing values from having any place in
research. It is possible to specify an interest in certain outcomes because one attaches
normative value to them, then ask as a factual matter whether those outcomes occur
empirically and, if so, when and how they come about. The second possible response
to the problems encountered by earlier studies is thus to accept that there is an
inherent normative connotation in asking about learning and to focus on figuring
out how to design empirical research that could help answer the questions learning
researchers really sought to ask.
To say someone learned, in ordinary language, normally implies they achieved
some form of improvement. Moreover, this connotation is unique to the term
learning and is not captured by discussing belief change or the lessons an individual
draws from the past. Since other terms exist for the neutral description of an
individual’s inferences, learning should not be stripped of its special meaning if that
meaning is implicit in questions the research community considers important. In
fact, the positive connotations of the word learning are essential to some major
literatures in IR.
Learning as an element of the realism-idealism debate
The lessons individuals draw from history are relevant for explaining foreign policy
decisions. But this focus does not capture all the ramifications involved in raising the
question of learning. In the context of the classic debate between realists and
idealists, the possibility of learning has much wider significance than the Levy
critique recognises.
Progress is one of the most contested issues in this long-standing debate. Realists
assume that the essential dynamics of international politics do not change. As Carr
puts it, although he distances himself from this position, ‘realism tends to emphasize
the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing
tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting
oneself to, these forces and these tendencies’.22 Neorealists similarly emphasise con-
tinuity. Waltz, for example, contends ‘The texture of international politics remains
highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly. . . . Over the
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22 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964 [1946]), p. 10.
centuries states have changed in many ways, but the quality of international life has
remained much the same.’23 Even in a book devoted to explaining change, Gilpin
starts from an assumption that ‘the fundamental nature of international relations
has not changed over the millennia’.24
This is the central difference in the assumptions of idealists and liberals, on the
one hand, and realists on the other. While realists doubt the possibility of progress,
idealists and their more cautious liberal successors seek to identify processes or
institutions that could bring about a more peaceful or equitable existence. Although
interwar idealism is associated with specific proposals, such as collective security and
international arbitration, in a broader sense the idealist project is not about specific
proposals, but rather involves a belief that human ingenuity can discover ways to
improve ‘the quality of international life’, to use Waltz’s phrase. For example, in a
recent re-examination of Kant’s prediction of a democratic peace, Cederman con-
cludes that ‘Kant’s reasoning depends on the idea of progress through learning’.25
This suggests that the possibility of learning is integral to the liberal and idealist
projects. To be sure, there are differences within the family of liberal approaches, and
not all theories emphasise cognitive change. Despite differences in emphasis, how-
ever, for all liberal and idealist theories, the possible improvements they envision
become much less likely if human consciousness does not perceive the possible paths
to achieving better outcomes; conversely, progress becomes more likely if states can
learn to do things differently.
Realists assume this possibility is non-existent and therefore a potentially danger-
ous illusion; to realists, the only possible learning is relearning either the need to
balance power or the constraints that require foreign policy continuity. Idealists
dispute this position. To any good social scientist, the answer must be determined
empirically. Therefore, the possibility or impossibility of learning how to make pro-
gress can and should be made an object of study, and not just treated as a starting
assumption of various theoretical paradigms.
The design of previous learning research has not been well matched to this
context. The desire to have a non-normative definition of learning and to avoid
appearing utopian has led to a focus on the role of cognitive changes in modifying
particular foreign policies or IO programmes. Yet learning by just one state or IO
will not necessarily be adequate to bring about international progress and,
depending on what cognitive change takes place, may not be favourable to conflict
reduction at all. A different research focus is required.
Toward shared learning
If a set of states agree on some premise that was not always part of their past
thinking, and acting consistently with this idea they achieve an outcome that is
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23 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 66,
110.
24 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
p. 7.
25 Lars-Erik Cederman, ‘Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical
Learning Process’, American Political Science Review, 95 (March 2001), p. 16.
better than observers would normally expect, we would by the usual meaning of the
term be inclined to say they had learned. Though there are exceptions, in many cases
such an improved international outcome would not come about if only one side
accepted the premise in question but other parties did not. Progress is thus most
likely if learning is common to multiple states.
Obviously, there can still be foreign policy learning that is not shared by others,
and this will often be of interest for other research agendas, but learning that is
unique to a single state or IO is less likely than cross-national learning to contribute
to international progress. If the question is whether people can find ways to reduce
armed conflict or increase beneficial forms of multilateral cooperation, the type of
learning that matters most is shared, international learning. Foreign policy learning
might serve as an important microfoundation for international learning, but empiric-
ally the key question would still be whether such learning occurs cross-nationally.
While cross-national and foreign policy learning are related, the inference
requirements for each lead to different research designs. For Levy, who sees learning
only as a possible explanation for foreign policy decisions, if everyone learns the
same thing then learning is ‘epiphenomenal’. If the goal is to explain individual
decision-making, then learning is only relevant when ‘different individuals . . .
behave differently’. To Levy, a learning model must predict that learning ‘varies
across actors’.26 Thus, Levy would actually have the least interest in cases where all
state leaders drew common lessons from experience. In such cases, Levy would
conclude this means a structural explanation is sufficient and there is no need to
investigate cognitions. In a decision-making approach, learning is only significant
when it is not shared.
If the interest is progress, however, the focus must be exactly the opposite. Hence,
those who seek to explain cooperation often raise the question of shared learning.
For example, Nye observes, we would normally expect the different US and Soviet
systems to have learned different lessons. Thus, especially with something as
consequential as nuclear weapons, ‘[i]t is particularly interesting when common
lessons are learned despite varying prior beliefs’. To Haas and Adler, learning
actually requires common inferences, not variation across individuals. With reference
to learning in IOs, Haas writes, ‘A common understanding of causes is likely to
trigger a shared understanding of solutions . . .’ And Adler contends that ‘A cogni-
tive evolutionary approach requires that new or changed ideas be communicated and
diffused . . .’27 Cederman similarly argues that for learning to play its role in Kant’s
prediction of democratic peace, multiple states must learn in common: ‘the process
depends crucially on both sides’ learning capacity’; the theory ‘presupposes collec-
tive learning, both at the state level and within the entire international system’.28
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Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and their Progress’, in
Adler and Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations, p. 54 (see also p. 58).
28 While Cederman presents aggregate data consistent with a hypothesis that learning increases the
amount of peace over time, he does not investigate whether there is empirical evidence for the actual
occurrence of international learning. He thus concludes that empirical research is still needed to
ascertain what ‘collective learning mechanisms operate’ at different points in time. Cederman, ‘Back
to Kant’, pp. 16, 21, 28.
If research focuses on common lessons and their diffusion, moreover, this makes
learning relevant to several other recent IR literatures. Not surprisingly, therefore,
learning is mentioned prominently is these other literatures. However, leading works
in these other research programmes often do not isolate learning per se as an area
for empirical research.
The role of shared learning in other literatures
The learning research programme that emerged in the 1980s is not the only con-
temporary body of IR theory that discusses learning. Studies of learning, especially
Haas’s cognitive evolution approach, were part of a general ‘reflectivist’ turn that
emphasised the ability of human beings to reflect upon and alter the ideas and
knowledge that guide behaviour. Interest in cognitive evolution led most directly to
research on epistemic communities, but learning also plays an important role in
social constructivism and critical theory. These latter approaches again emphasise
learning that is shared across states, not learning in foreign policy. Moreover, they do
so because, consistent with the argument above, they see learning as related to the
prospects for progress. For the most part, though, these other literatures simply
assume that learning occurs as an intermediate step in a larger process, so they do
not seek to study learning empirically. Thus, research on international learning is
still needed and would contribute to a range of contemporary theory debates as well
as to the traditional realism-idealism debate.
For example, Linklater’s approach to critical theory utilises notions of learning
drawn from Habermas. Linklater also explicitly connects critical theory to the
realism-idealism debate. He presents it as a challenge to the realist assumption of
immutability on the one hand, and as a way to recover and update ‘the old idealist
programme’ on the other. From a critical theory perspective, Linklater claims,
international politics can be shown to be a realm of progress, not stasis.29
How does progress arise? Consistent with the account of learning developed
above, Linklater claims that progress will come about ‘[t]hrough learning processes’
that lead to a ‘more adequate inter-subjective consensus’. Linklater identifies
Habermas’s notion of ‘moral-practical learning’ in particular as the type of learning
needed.30 Linklater’s argument is purely theoretical however. He makes no attempt
to investigate empirically whether moral-practical learning actually happens inter-
nationally.
Shared learning should also be of particular interest to social constructivists given
their focus on intersubjective understandings and the diffusion of norms. Moreover,
like earlier idealist thought, constructivism also envisions the possibility of progress
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30 Linklater, ‘A Postscript on Habermas and Foucault’ in Men and Citizens, p. 217; ‘The Question of the
Next Stage’, p. 95; ‘The Achievements of Critical Theory’, p. 285.
in world politics.31 In fact, given the overlapping concerns of constructivism and
cognitive evolutionary approaches, some scholars like Adler who came out of the
Haasian tradition have explicitly embraced constructivism and sought to subsume
Haas’s notion of cognitive evolution within constructivism.32
Not surprisingly, learning does receive attention in the constructivist literature.
Learning is especially vital in Wendt’s account of constructivism. Specifically, Wendt
argues that if the international system is ever to evolve from a Hobbesian state of
war to a Kantian world of collective security, social learning will be the primary
mechanism of change.33 However, Wendt does not describe learning as if it might be
problematic. Hence, he neither conducts nor calls for empirical research focused
specifically on learning.
This same issue arises in efforts to apply constructivism to questions of peace and
security. Adler and Barnett have edited a volume that uses a constructivist approach
to re-examine Deutsch’s earlier ideas about pluralistic security communities.34 Adler
and Barnett posit that social learning is one process in the emergence of security
communities. However, their book is not an effort to study learning per se, so their
framework simply assumes that such learning occurs, as an intermediate step in their
larger model. They do not seek to investigate learning empirically.
However, some empirical research on social learning has emerged. Finnemore
hypothesises that ‘countries learn from the international environment’,35 and in
several case studies she traces the internalisation of new norms by states. Checkel
has investigated social learning as a possible reason for the spread of human rights
norms in Europe.36 As Checkel acknowledges, however, his existing model and case
studies remain purely one-way: 37 one side already espouses a norm and diffuses it
through persuasion to the second side. Shared learning could arise in other ways
however, such as through the separate learning of similar lessons or, more import-
ant, through joint learning that arises from mutual interaction. Moreover, social
learning emphasises the learning of norms of appropriate behaviour, but other
forms of learning could also play a role in promoting progress. However, Finnemore,
Checkel, and other constructivists tend not to consider other possible forms of
learning beyond the diffusion of norms. Empirical research is thus still needed on
these other possibilities.
Because cross-national learning plays an important role in theorising by critical
theorists and constructivists, empirical research on international learning would
contribute to these other literatures. In addition, the fact that learning must be
shared internationally for the changes hypothesised in these theories to take place
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enhances the case for maintaining such a research focus distinct from efforts to study
foreign policy learning within a cognitive paradigm.
The need for descriptive inference
While shared learning is relevant to the prospects for improving the quality of
international outcomes, it is important to recognise that learning is not necessary for
international cooperation to occur and that not every form of learning leads to
progress. For example, if states enter an alliance for traditional balance-of-power
reasons, no new learning may be required to produce this cooperation. In addition,
not all cooperation or dissemination of knowledge leads to normatively desirable
outcomes. Some states may collaborate simply in order to exploit others. And some
know-how that diffuses, such as how to make biological weapons, is unlikely to
make the world a better place. Not all learning is conducive to progress, and
progress may have other causes besides learning. But many cases of progress will
involve some prior learning process. Thus, if we are interested in assessing the
prospects for making progress in international relations, it will be valuable to
examine whether internationally shared learning that favours peace or cooperation
ever develops.
For now, this makes the primary goal descriptive inference. The eventual goal is
still explanatory theory, so we can determine whether and how it is possible to cause
favourable changes in the probability of desired outcomes. But we also need to
determine as an empirical matter whether shared learning even occurs or could be a
plausible outcome.
One possible approach is to specify one’s model of learning first, then evaluate
whether or not various cases fit the model. Haas has taken this approach, describing
in detail a particular model of the learning process that can be used as ‘a coding
scheme . . . to judge’ when learning has occurred.38 The core feature of this model is
the introduction of new causal or technical knowledge, usually by an epistemic
community.39 As noted above, and consistent with the argument of this article, Haas
and others in his research programme also connect such learning to the possibility of
progress. Hence, Adler and Crawford claim that ‘the key to progress . . . lies in the
realm of cognitive change or learning, which can result from the increasing use of
knowledge in the policy process.’ Haas describes the purpose of a 1997 book
similarly: ‘I want to explore the hypothesis that progress has occurred in international
politics, but I also want to argue that progress has occurred because our conceptions
of what constitute political problems, and of solutions to these problems, have
increasingly been informed by the form of reasoning we label “scientific”’.40
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While the use of knowledge supplied by an epistemic community is one plausible
route to learning, it is not the only possible pathway. This is especially true for issues
like security where political leaders may trust their own judgment and thus not feel a
need to defer to technical experts. In contrast to Haas, therefore, I believe it is better
not to commit, prior to empirical research, to a particular portrait of what learning
looks like or how it occurs. If states find ways to coordinate that produce more
security or less conflict, this is an important finding regardless of whether epistemic
communities, social learning, or any other particular prespecified mechanism were
involved.
To make the discussion less abstract, however, it may help to suggest some ways in
which shared learning might emerge. Processes that could lead states to share the
same lessons or ideas include: an evolution in both sides’ thinking as a result of their
bargaining or working together; persuasion of one side by the other side; lobbying
of both by an epistemic community or, alternatively, by a transnational advocacy
network that does not claim any special technical expertise; or separate internal
processes that lead to the same conclusion. If one is interested in explaining or
promoting learning, it will be important to develop a more detailed understanding
of the processes and mechanisms involved, but at this stage it is advisable to seek
this understanding, at least in part, inductively.
In sum, the goals of descriptive and causal inference can be separated. The
various liberal challenges to realism depend on the possibility of learning, not on the
particular mechanisms that produce learning. Hence, independently of the causal
model one might propose to explain learning, empirical research is required to assess
whether international learning occurs and is associated with cases of progress.
The most obvious supporting example is the development of the European
Union. Among a set of states that once experienced recurring warfare, there has
now been a long period of peace and friendship. At the same time, though, it will be
important to show this case is not an anomaly and there are other likely cases of
learning. Moreover, study of other cases is needed to broaden the database for
drawing inferences about the conditions and processes involved.
A roadmap for research
Given a goal of descriptive inference, I propose proceeding on two tracks. First,
learning research must consider whether there are other cases that, like the
development of the European community, strongly appear to indicate learning. In
each case, process tracing should be used to ascertain whether the actors in question
communicated shared understandings that differ from ideas that were associated
with less favourable outcomes in the past. Below, I apply this approach to the case of
Argentine-Brazilian relations.
The second approach is to identify potential sources or forms of shared learning
that it seems feasible to research empirically. If one identifies mechanisms that could
produce learning whose presence can be confirmed or disconfirmed relatively easily,
then one could explore how frequently one finds these mechanisms in operation; the
more examples, the stronger the case would be for thinking international learning is
possible, while lack of cases would count against such a hypothesis. For this second
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track, I propose returning to the ‘lessons of history’, only this time with a focus on
whether they are shared cross-nationally. This is not to suggest that every agreement
on a lesson of history will result in progress, nor that shared analogies are the only
possible route to progress. However, in the context of debates about the possibility
of progress, it would be meaningful if one could identify clear empirical evidence for
the operation of even one mechanism with the potential to facilitate progress.
A suggestive example
The possibility of cross-national sharing of historical analogies is suggested by a
well-known example whose implications have not been fully grasped. The existing
literature on the influence of historical analogies predicts that national leaders will
draw their lessons from traumatic international events their own country
experienced during their formative years or from recent events in which those leaders
were personally involved.41 The example most often cited is how the generation of
US leaders that came of age during World War II always referred to the ‘lessons of
Munich’.
There is a puzzle here, however. No Americans were at Munich, nor was it the
appeasement of Hitler that brought America into World War II. Rather, the surprise
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, an undeniably traumatic event, forced the US into
the conflict. The prominence instead of the Munich analogy suggests that countries
are not prisoners of their own experiences. If multiple countries can draw common
conclusions from a historical event not all of them experienced, this could form a
basis for policy coordination.
Sharing of an analogy is no guarantee of cooperation. As a number of observers
have noted, the inferences American leaders drew from the lessons of the 1930s
generally discouraged cooperation during the Cold War.42 However, the question
here is only whether there are some cases where agreement among a set of states on
a historical analogy encourages a cooperative approach to security; if some cases
work this way, this would be evidence for the possibility of international learning
even if not every shared analogy facilitates progress. Moreover, if one looks beyond
the Cold War, in other circumstances even the lessons of the 1930s might encourage
cooperation. After all, Munich is not just an object lesson on the risks of making
concessions; it also contains a lesson about the need to act together to stop cam-
paigns of aggression. One case that illustrates sharing of this lesson is the building
of the coalition that fought against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War.
The Gulf War case
The Gulf War is not an ideal test of the hypothesis that a shared belief in a
particular lesson of history can be a form of international learning. The outcome
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was a war, while I have argued that international learning will lead to progress
towards peace. The use of force does not automatically mean no learning was
involved however. In the Wilsonian strand of idealism, with its emphasis on
collective security, action by the international community to defeat aggression is
intended to deter future aggressors and reassure insecure states, thereby improving
the prospects for peace in the future. To the extent it strengthened norms against
aggression, the Gulf War might still count as progress.
More important, even if one is not convinced that this case represented progress,
this does not undermine the main point of this case study. The goal here is to show
that multiple states can agree on certain lessons of history and this agreement can
encourage them to cooperate. This possibility is a sub-hypothesis that can be
examined separately from the broader hypothesis that learning to make progress is
possible. Once the possibility that multiple states can employ the same analogy is
established, additional cases can be used to explore whether and under what condi-
tions this mechanism helps promote better international outcomes.
Because US President George H.W. Bush publicly compared Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein to Hitler, some early analysts of the Gulf case concluded that the Munich
analogy largely explained the US decision to use force against Iraq.43 As an explan-
ation of foreign policy, there are some obvious possible objections to this argument.
References to Nazi Germany may have been calculated to sway public opinion and
put Congressional opponents of military action in an awkward position, without
really being believed by the President and his aides in private. However, this
objection misses the point with respect to international learning. The question is
whether officials of two or more governments, in private communications intended
to generate agreement on the correct course of action, give assent to the same
historical analogy. If two or more states agree on a certain analogy in settings that
are not geared towards public consumption and this agreement helps them co-
ordinate policy, then it is reasonable to conclude that those states have shared some
form of learning. In fact, there is evidence that lessons of the 1930s played a role in
the development of a multilateral response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
A belief that Saddam Hussein would interpret offers of compromise in a manner
similar to Hitler was expressed by several Middle Eastern leaders. They appeared to
be trying to ensure that other states in the region, and also the United States, would
stand firm against Iraq. In his joint memoirs with Brent Scowcroft, his national
security advisor, President Bush quotes a phone conversation in which King Fahd
of Saudi Arabia told him that Saddam ‘is following Hitler in creating world
problems. . . . I believe nothing will work with Saddam but the use of force.’ In a
subsequent conversation with Turkish President Turgut Ozal, Ozal told Bush he had
sought to reinforce Fahd’s will: ‘I told him that if the solution is that Iraq pulls back
and Kuwait pays, that is not a solution but another Munich’. President Bush in turn
referred to messages like these in internal administration discussions. At an NSC
meeting where Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney expressed doubt about the
prospects of maintaining support for military action against Hussein, Bush told
Cheney he was underestimating world opinion: ‘Lots of people are calling him
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Hitler’. These analogies were all made in private settings and apparently helped
generate agreement among a set of states on a common response to Iraq’s occupation
of Kuwait.44
Analogies to the 1930s also arose in another setting: the UN Security Council
debate on Resolution 678, which authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’ to force
Iraq out of Kuwait. During the debate, three of the 15 members referred explicitly
to the failure by the League of Nations to act against Italy after its 1935 invasion of
Ethiopia.45 In line with the traditional hypothesis that countries make analogies to
their own past traumatic experiences, Ethiopia was one of the states that raised this
analogy. But the other two countries that cited this example, Romania and the
United States, were not drawing on any lesson from a failure in their own past.
Romania had supported keeping sanctions against Italy in place, while the US had
not even been a member of the League. The fact that three of the 12 countries that
voted for Resolution 678 all drew on the same analogy again suggests that it is
possible for states to share historical lessons.
This is not to argue that analogies to the 1930s fully explain the war against Iraq;
other considerations, such as oil, also clearly played a role. And it is certainly not to
argue that invoking the lessons of the 1930s tends in general to improve the chances
for peace: the many references to Hitler and appeasement in the US Congress, when
it voted in October 2002 to authorise again using force against Iraq, show otherwise.
But it is also worth recognising that the United Nations’ support and the particip-
ation of a broad coalition added legitimacy to the military action in 1991 and
increased the chances that states contemplating aggression in the future would
anticipate resistance. It is likely that a shared understanding of certain lessons of the
past contributed to this multilateral response to Iraq’s invasion. Of greatest relevance
for present purposes, it at least appears that states can agree on the relevance of
analogies to historical events that not all of them experienced directly. This suggests
it would be worthwhile to conduct further research on whether there are other cases
of shared lessons and, if so, what consequences this has.
Other possible shared analogies
Because the hardline implications of the Munich analogy often discourage efforts to
achieve peace, it is important to consider whether there are alternative analogies that
might be more conducive to cooperation that aims to avoid the use of force. The
origins of World War I provide one possible alternative. One well-known interpret-
ation of the war views it as a case of inadvertent escalation. In this view, leaders in a
crisis situation lost control of events once they ordered military mobilisation,
making it important not to repeat the mistakes that made escalation so hard to avoid
in 1914.
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An analogy to this image of 1914 influenced the theory of arms control that
emerged in the West in the early 1960s.46 The new arms control theory emphasised
that, if there were advantages to striking first in a crisis, reciprocal fears of surprise
attack could lead to a nuclear war no one wanted. Influential studies such as
Schelling and Halperin’s classic text supported this argument about the danger of
accidental or inadvertent nuclear war (and thus the need for arms control) with
explicit references to the events of 1914.47
For the 1914 analogy to facilitate progress on arms control, however, both sides
would have had to agree on the relevant lessons, and there is no publicly available
evidence that the Soviet Union proposed a similar interpretation of this analogy
during arms control talks. Only further research using archival and other primary-
source materials could determine whether nuclear arms control is an issue where a
shared lesson of history contributed to cooperation. However, the fact that some
Americans drew lessons from the July crisis, which again is not a situation that
involved the United States, indicates that 1914 could potentially serve as a source of
shared lessons.
The Gulf War and nuclear arms control cases suggest that investigating whether
two or more parties agree on a particular historical analogy is one feasible way to
assess the empirical evidence for shared learning. The hypothesised connection
between shared lessons and progress is less clear in these cases however. The co-
operation in the Gulf War did not lead to a sufficiently satisfactory outcome to keep
the threat of another war against Iraq from re-emerging barely a decade later. And
the possible sharing of the 1914 analogy has not been demonstrated at this point. The
uncertainties in these cases suggest it would be useful to supplement this evidence by
working in the other direction, that is, by identifying a case where evidence of
progress is strong in order to explore whether shared learning also took place.
A final illustration: Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement
The dramatic transformation of relations between Argentina and Brazil constitutes
such a case. During decades of rivalry, the two countries limited their trade and
cooperation. Fear of war between them reached a high point in the 1960s and 1970s,
when leading military officials and strategists in both countries embraced zero-sum
‘geo-political’ doctrines.48 Barely a decade later, Argentina and Brazil had achieved
such a level of friendship and cooperation that military conflict between them had
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become virtually unthinkable. Two dramatic changes both contributed to and
symbolised this transformation. The two sides adopted measures that eliminated
lingering suspicions that they were interested in developing nuclear weapons. And
they began an economic integration process that created Mercosur, the Common
Market of the Southern Cone.
These changes in Argentine-Brazilian relations are convincing evidence of pro-
gress.49 But did shared learning contribute to this progress? While some policy changes
did not derive from shared learning, cross-national learning proved important in two
ways. First, the two sides came to a shared view of the connections between issues,
especially a mutual realisation that nuclear cooperation was necessary to make
economic integration possible. After that, they shared learning about how to make
progress within issues: in particular, their nuclear rapprochement evolved in important
ways as a result of the very process of trying to work together. This is thus a case of
inherently joint learning. In contrast to the Gulf War case, where multiple states
independently drew similar lessons from the past, in this case the two countries would
not have drawn matching lessons if their foreign policies had evolved separately.
Nuclear policy change and its role in rapprochement
Both countries began working on nuclear technology as part of their economic
development efforts, and neither government ever made an official decision to build
nuclear weapons. However, certain features of their nuclear programmes created
suspicions, both in the other capital and internationally, that they were working to
get the bomb. First, Argentina and Brazil sought to develop technology that would
give them the potential to produce weapons-grade fissile materials: each built a plant
to enrich uranium, and Argentina also started work on a plant to reprocess
plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Second, the two countries refrained from joining
and implementing the major regional and global non-proliferation agreements. They
vigorously criticised the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a discriminatory
agreement designed to prevent developing countries from gaining access to civil
nuclear technology. As a result, they refused to place their facilities related to
producing uranium and plutonium fuel under full-scope safeguards (FSSG), which
had developed under the non-proliferation regime as a way to prevent diversion of
nuclear fuel to military uses.50
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Nuclear policy change was an element of Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement
from the beginning. Rapprochement began in the late 1970s, when both countries
were still under military rule. It included agreements to cooperate on civil nuclear
technology development so as to overcome problems created by restrictions that
exporters of nuclear fuel and technology had imposed due to Argentina and
Brazil’s suspected proliferation ambitions. This cooperation would not have done
anything to foreclose the weapons option, but it still represented a change from the
previous pattern of intense competition and opened the door to further co-
operation.51
The rapprochement process gained momentum after both countries returned to
democracy. Indeed, desire to consolidate democracy provided an important motiv-
ation. In Argentina, Raul Alfonsin won the 1983 election that ended military rule.
After Brazil returned to democracy, Jose Sarney became its president in 1985. Both
new administrations feared their democracies would not survive unless regional
threat perceptions could be changed in a way that would remove pretexts for the
military to interfere in domestic politics.52
The two sides also agreed on the nature of the initiatives they should take.
Alfonsin and Sarney gave high priority to economic integration, partly as a way to
respond to economic problems, but also as a way to change political relations and
build barriers against a possible future reversion to adversarial relations.53 A
shared analogy played a role here as well, and as in the examples discussed above
it came from outside the two countries’ own past experience. Diplomats from the
two sides discussed how the European Economic Community had helped prevent
any return to authoritarian rule in Spain, Portugal or Greece after their demo-
cratisation in the 1970s, and this reinforced their belief that economic integration
could help consolidate democracy in the Southern Cone.54 In July 1986, the two
presidents concluded a treaty initiating an Argentine-Brazilian economic integra-
tion programme.
Just recognising the desirability of reducing tensions and increasing economic
cooperation did not automatically make these goals achievable however. Closer
examination reveals that nuclear rapprochement was critical to the realisation of
economic integration and political rapprochement. At the same time, finding the
means to make nuclear rapprochement effective was also a noteworthy feat. Both
aspects of nuclear cooperation reflect shared learning.
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Shared learning in the denuclearisation process
Former officials from both countries have made it clear that nuclear cooperation was
deliberately tied to economic integration and that nuclear rapprochement cannot be
understood except in the context of the effort to change economic relations.55 The
connections made between the nuclear and economic efforts were especially import-
ant in convincing the two sides to overcome their prior commitments to autonomous
development of nuclear technology. The mutual recognition of a connection thus
represents the chief manifestation of shared learning in this case.
The simplest realisation was that economic integration would not proceed very far
if the two sides continued to harbour military suspicions. To allay suspicions, it was
necessary to have a shared understanding of the steps that would signal a turning
away from rivalry. This came from agreement on the importance of nuclear
cooperation. As a former Brazilian ambassador to Argentina has explained:
The time was ripe for action and the nuclear domain was chosen by elected Brazilian and
Argentinean leaders because advances here would have a profound impact on . . . both
societies and provide an eloquent symbol for the two recently restored democracies. . . . It is
quite obvious that economic and commercial integration could not easily coexist with
military rivalry or strategic planning of an adversarial nature.56
Reflecting the perceived linkages, Sarney and Alfonsin held several summit meetings
that focused on economic and nuclear cooperation. Moreover, agreements in one
area were overtly related to agreements in the other. For example, a December 1986
protocol on nuclear cooperation described the envisioned nuclear cooperation as
related to ‘the objectives set forth in the [July 1986] Statement on Argentine-
Brazilian Integration’.57
Seeing that their nuclear programmes could undermine integration was the first
step in the learning process. As the two sides moved forward, however, they came to
the further realisation that joint development of civilian nuclear technology could
not allay suspicions about possible secret military programmes. The two sides had to
create greater transparency in their nuclear programmes as well. The two presidents
thus began a reciprocal process of inviting each other to tour the nuclear facilities
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that prompted the most concern about possible weapons programmes, including some
plants that had previously been secret. Between July 1987 and November 1988, Sarney
visited Argentina’s uranium enrichment plant and the plutonium reprocessing facility
it had under construction, while Alfonsin visited Brazil’s uranium enrichment facility.58
As two Brazilian officials later explained, ‘the latent misgivings and suspicious per-
ceptions of each other’s nuclear programmes had to be overcome if the economic
integration was to have any meaning. It was at that stage (1987 and 1988) that the first
reciprocal visits to each country’s most sensitive nuclear facilities were undertaken.’59
After the last of these visits, a joint statement released by the two presidents
emphasised that the visits and implementation of joint projects to date had produced
‘a growing and continuing mutual understanding’.60 In other words, the presidents
indicated that they even saw themselves as going through a joint learning process.
The successors to Alfonsin and Sarney, Carlos Menem (elected in 1989) and
Fernando Collor de Mello (elected in 1990), continued the process. Based on
interviews with officials in both countries, John Redick ascertained that ‘[b]oth
presidents recognized that dramatic new nuclear cooperation initiatives could serve
to accelerate economic and political coordination’.61 Meeting in November 1990,
Collor and Menem reached a new nuclear cooperation agreement. In part, it
extended the mutual confidence-building effort of their predecessors, by proposing
to establish a joint system of nuclear accounting and inspections. However, the 1990
Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy also moved beyond the previous bilateral
approach. In a dramatic policy shift, Brazil and Argentina also committed to
negotiating a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA); this agreement was signed in December 1991.62 Having overcome
their longstanding opposition to international safeguards, the two countries also
eventually joined the NPT (though congressional resistance delayed Brazil’s
accession until 1998).
The decisions to accept FSSG and the NPT reflect a further step in the learning
process. Former foreign ministry officials in both countries have stressed that the
leadership in each came to realise that measures to reassure each other as to their
peaceful nuclear intentions were not sufficient to reassure the rest of the world,
which could still suspect the two countries of colluding to hide nuclear arms
programmes.63 Since the two countries had also made participation in the global
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economy a priority, it no longer made sense to continue suffering the denial of
access to advanced technology caused by their refusal of FSSG.64
These final steps required Argentina and Brazil to execute a complete about-face
on positions to which they had been overtly committed for decades. The shift from
denouncing the non-proliferation regime as discriminatory to accepting its legiti-
macy was only possible because of the prior learning process in the two states and
the resulting steps they had already taken jointly to eliminate the possibility of
covert nuclear weapons development.65 It is doubtful whether either country acting
in isolation would have made such a large policy change. Shared, international
learning was necessary to enable a degree of progress that foreign policy learning in
just one of the countries could not have generated.
Conclusions
At the end of his critical review essay, Levy concludes: ‘Our understanding of the
role of learning in foreign policy and policy change more generally will be best
served if we abandon the attempt to construct an analytically distinct “learning
model”’.66 I disagree. The question of learning is too important to be abandoned as
an analytically distinct research programme.
When scholars raised the question of foreign policy learning in the 1980s, they
encountered significant problems, many of which Levy elucidates persuasively. But
there is more than one way to respond to these problems. Levy assumes that the goal
is to map and explain all of the belief changes leaders undergo, and the most recent
studies of learning have tended to adopt this research agenda. This is a valid and
interesting research agenda, but it is not what the initial efforts to study learning
were really about, nor should it be the only focus of learning research.
To ask about learning in ordinary language is often to ask about the possibility of
progress or improvement. If we accept this positive connotation, it leads us to
another context in which learning carries great importance: the traditional debate
between realists and idealists. Realists deny any possibility of substantial progress in
eliminating war or institutionalising cooperation. Idealists contend that progress is
possible and that it will involve changes in human understanding. More recent
writings on critical theory and social constructivism make similar claims. The
question of whether such learning is possible is thus too central an issue in inter-
national relations for us to give up doing research explicitly on this question.
The kind of learning that matters most in this context is shared learning. To
improve the quality of international outcomes, states will generally have to work
together, and they are more likely to do so if they agree about the ideas that should
guide policy. Among earlier learning researchers, Haas and Adler showed the most
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interest in shared learning, but they associated learning primarily with the growth of
scientific knowledge, and there is no reason to assume this is the only possible source
of learning. Constructivists and critical theorists also discuss shared learning, but
they often do not treat it as problematic and requiring further research. Moreover,
the constructivist emphasis on social learning limits the focus to the diffusion of
norms, which again excludes other possible forms of learning. Because the prospects
for and potential sources of learning are still uncertain, it is important to conduct
empirical research on international learning as a focus in its own right.
In the areas of conflict and security, the simplest source of cross-national learning
may be agreement on the lessons of certain historical events. The indications that
lessons of the 1930s played a role in the development of the Gulf War coalition and
references to 1914 in US works on arms control suggest that this is a plausible
avenue of research. As a second direction for research, this article also proposes
identifying cases that strongly appear to represent progress and then tracing how
those cases developed to see if shared ideas helped the countries concerned achieve
progress. A study of the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil illustrated the
potential of this approach. It showed that shared learning about their nuclear
programmes helped make their rapprochement a reality. Moreover, important
elements of this learning arose jointly out of the effort to work together. This
suggests that shared learning need not always arise prior to cooperation, but can
also develop through mutual learning during the process of cooperation itself.
The study of learning is conceptually distinct from the study of decision-making.
If one wants to refer to learning in the latter context, I propose that the terms
foreign policy or individual learning be used, while we use international learning to
refer to those types of learning that might be a route to progress in international
relations. Whatever terminology is used, however, the bottom line is that inter-
national learning is sufficiently important to warrant further research.
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